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Abstract This paper considers the issue of forecasting ¯nancial fragility of banks
and insurances using a panel data set of performance indicators, namely distance-to-
default, taking unobserved common factors into account. We show that common
factors are important in the performance of banks and insurances, analyze the
in°uences of a number of observable factors on banking and insurance performance,
and evaluate the forecasts from our model. We ¯nd that taking unobserved common
factors into account reduces the the root mean square forecasts error of ¯rm speci¯c
forecasts by up to 11% and of system forecasts by up to 29% relative to a model
based only on observed variables. Estimates of the factor loadings suggest that
the correlation of ¯nancial institutions has been relatively stable over the forecast
period.
JEL classi¯cation: C53, G21, G22
Keywords: Financial stability; ¯nancial linkages; banking; insurances; unobserved
common factors; forecasting
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The credit crunch of 2007/08 demonstrates that ¯nancial linkages between
banks and insurances are considerable within and across regions. This cri-
sis has not only severely a®ected the solvency of major US banks but has
also put insurers and several European banks under pressure. One reason
for this is the sizable market for credit derivatives, which serves banks to
reallocate their exposure to credit risks. The estimated volume of global
credit default swaps outstanding in 2007 is $62.17 trillion, which is a 100-
fold increase compared to the market size in 2001 and is now about twice
the size of the domestic credit volume in the G10 countries.1 With a market
share of around 20%, insurance companies are a major seller of credit pro-
tection. Additionally, insurance companies increasingly transfer insurance
risks to capital markets by selling alternative risk transfer instruments such
as catastrophe bonds.
The strong ¯nancial linkages within and between the banking and insur-
ance sectors have important implications for ¯nancial stability. In particular,
when forecasting systemic risk linkages within the ¯nancial sector need to
be taken into account whether they are caused by ¯nancial linkages or by
common shocks to the ¯nancial system.
In this paper, we consider the problem of forecasting the performance of
banks and insurance companies individually and in aggregate in the presence
of unobserved linkages and common shocks. We model the linkages between
banks and insurances using unobserved common factors. Our econometric
method is based on the CCE estimator of Pesaran (2006) and allows us to
extract common factors while at the same time including observed variables
in the regression. While the possibility of such a procedure has been hinted
at by Pesaran (2006), we are not aware of any other application of this
methodology to date. The ¯rst contribution of this paper is therefore of
a methodological nature: the combined use of unobserved common factors
and observed variables for forecasting in a panel data set.
In factor-based estimations in the literature the factors are usually ob-
tained from panel data which are not modeled themselves by using observed
variables, for example, Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005). This means that
a large amount of other data are needed beyond the variables of interest in
order to extract the factors. In our analysis, we can estimate the factors
together with the parameters of the observed variables in the model and
therefore only need a panel data set of the variables of interest.
The second major contribution of this paper is the investigation of the
forecast performance of macroeconomic and factor augmented models of the
fragility of banks and insurances. We use a number of macroeconomic vari-
ables to forecast the performance of banks and insurances in a panel data set
1Source: International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA)
2spanning 211 banks and 120 insurance companies in 21 countries. We show
that taking unobserved common factors into account leads to large improve-
ments in the forecasts of the performance of individual ¯nancial institutions
and in the forecast of systemic risk even after the macroeconomic variables
have been accounted for. By estimating unobserved common factors for dif-
ferent groups we gain an insight into the importance of cross-sectoral and
cross-regional factors and we ¯nd that information in ¯rms in other regions
and industries can improve the forecasts.
A large body of literature exists that considers the forecast of systemic
risk in the ¯nancial sector, surveyed, for example, by De Bandt and Hart-
mann (2002). Much of the work concentrates either on one asset, such as
currency crises, for example Frankel and Rose (1996) and Kumar, Moor-
thy and Perraudin (2002). There are, however, a number of papers that
consider the issue of currency and banking crises such as Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1999).
A number of studies have investigated the issue of risk transfer between
the banking and the insurance sector. Allen and Carletti (2006) use a model
with banking and insurance sectors and show that credit risk transfer can
be bene¯cial when banks face uniform demand for liquidity. However, when
they face idiosyncratic liquidity risk and hedge this risk in the interbank
market, credit risk transfer can be detrimental to welfare by leading to con-
tagion between the two sectors. Monks and Stringa (2005) consider individ-
ual events and ¯nd that there is no clear evidence of spill-overs from the UK
life insurance sector to the UK banking sector as a whole. However, they
¯nd evidence of a reaction from bancassurers' equity prices to life insurance
events, which suggest that there is potential channel for spill-overs to the
banking sector via ownership. Slijkerman, Schoenmaker and de Vries (2005)
show that the cross-sectoral tail-dependence between banks' and insurances'
equity prices is lower than the within-sector equity tail-dependence.
However, most papers only investigate forecasts based on observable vari-
ables, examples are the early warning systems for currency crises discussed
by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998), Berg and Pattillo (1999), and
Edison (2003). We will show that cross-sectoral information and unobserved
common factors are important for forecasting systemic risk.
Another aspect of systemic risk is ¯nancial contagion as discussed, for
example, by Pesaran and Pick (2007). Financial contagion is the direct
e®ect of a crisis of one company or in one market on the performance of
other companies or markets. In this paper we are not concerned with the
source of the common factors but are interested in incorporating unobserved
common factors in order to improve the forecast of systemic risk. In fact,
Pesaran and Pick (2007) show that as the number of cross-section units
increases contagion is observationally equivalent to a common factor and
may therefore be captured by unobserved common factors.
We use distance-to-default (DD) as proposed by Crosbie and Bohn (2003)
3as the measure of performance of the banks and insurances, which is in con-
trast to the papers on banking and insurance dependence mentioned above.
DD is based on the theoretical option pricing model of Merton (1974). It
is therefore an internally consistent measure but will su®er from any inap-
propriate assumptions made in the model. However, a large literature has
found DD to be an empirically useful measure.
In a survey among ¯nancial stability reports issued by central banks,
Cih¶ ak (2006) shows that DD is one of the most frequently used market-based
risk indicators. An advantage of DD, as pointed out by Vassalou and Xing
(2004), is that it combines information about stock returns with leverage and
volatility information, and is therefore a more e±cient indicator of default
risk than simple equity price based indicators. Market-based risk measures
have been found to be more reliable than other measures relying on ¯nan-
cial statements (Hillegeist, Keating, Cram and Lundstedt 2004, Demirovic
and Thomas 2007) and to predict supervisory ratings, bond spreads, and
rating agencies' downgrades in both developed and developing economies
better than \reduced form" statistical models of default intensities (Arora,
Bohn and Zhu 2005). Bharath and Shumway (2008) compare DD to other
measures of default and ¯nd that that DD \provide(s) useful guidance for
building default forecasting models" (Bharath and Shumway 2008, p1368).
Furthermore, as pointed out by Demirovic and Thomas (2007) and Cih¶ ak
(2006), market-based indicators such as DD incorporate market participants'
forward-looking assessments, while accounting measures of risk, such as the
z-score, are backward-looking. Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2006) and Chan-
Lau, Jobert and Kong (2004) ¯nd that in mature and emerging market
economies DD appears to be a good measure for predicting rating down-
grades of banks. Finally, Gropp and Moerman (2004) show that the ability
of this indicator to measure risk is not a®ected by the presence of explicit
or implicit safety nets (e.g. `too-big-to-fail').
In the next section, we discuss the econometric approach. Section 3 de-
scribes the data used in the empirical study, which are analyzed in Section 4.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The econometric model
We are interested in forecasting the fragility of banks and insurances as
measured by their DD at T + h using the information up to time T, that
is, ^ yi;T+hjT, where i = 1;2;:::;N denotes the ¯rms, that is, the banks and
insurances. We will initially focus on forecasting the fragility of individual
institutions and in second a step turn to forecasting the fragility of the
banking and insurance sector in aggregate.
Suppose that yit can be described by the following model
yit = ®0
idt + ¯0
ixit + uit; t = 1;2;:::T + h (1)
4where dt is a l£1 vector of observed common factors, including the intercept,
and xit a k £ 1 vector of individual speci¯c regressors, including lags of yit.
Further assume that a ¯nancial institution's performance is correlated
with the performance of other institutions beyond what can be explained
by the determinants contained in the vectors dt and xit. We introduce this
via the error term, uit, which is assumed to contain m unobserved common
factors,
uit = °0
ift + "it; (2)
where °i is a m£1 vector of parameters, ft is a m£1 vector of unobserved
common factors, and "i » (0;§i), where §i is a positive de¯nite matrix.
Assume the individual speci¯c regressors xit, the common observed and
unobserved factors, dt and ft, have vector autoregressive forms,
xit = P 0
ixi;t¡1 + ´it; ´t » iid(0;¾2
´); (3)
dt = ¤0dt¡1 + ³t; ³t » iid(0;¾2
³); (4)
and
ft = £0ft¡1 + »t; »t » iid(0;¾2
»); (5)
and xit, dt and ft are assumed to be stationary. Clearly, we could assume
higher order autoregressive processes for xit, dt and ft but for expositional
simplicity we restrict attention to ¯rst order auto-regressive cases. Also, the
exogeneity of xit and dt with respect to ft is assumed for ease of exposition
and not strictly necessary.
2.1 Estimation of the parameters
The estimation of the parameters proceeds in three steps. First we estimate
the error term uit using the common correlated e®ects (CCE) estimator
(Pesaran 2006), then recover the factors, ft using principle components
analysis, and ¯nally obtain the parameters in (1) via OLS estimation.
We estimate the residual, ^ ui, described in (2) in a two step approach.
In the ¯rst step we apply the CCE estimator of Pesaran (2006), who shows
that augmenting the regression equation (1) by cross-section averages of yit
and xit eliminates the e®ects of unobserved factors and leads to a consistent
estimation of ¯0
i, which is
^ ¯it = (X0
iQMXi)¡1X0
iQMyi; (6)
where yi = (yi1;yi2;:::;yiT)0, Xi = (x0
i1;x0
i2;:::;x0
iT)0, QM = I¡ M(M0M)¡1M0,
M = (¹ Zw;D), D = (d0
1;d0
2;:::;dT)0, ¹ Zw = (¹ z0
w1; ¹ z0
w2;:::; ¹ z0
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5for some constant c.
Given the consistent estimation of ^ ¯it we can calculate the residual
ºit = uit + ®idt
as
^ ºit = yit ¡ ^ ¯
0
itxit
After obtaining the estimated residual ºit the common observed factors
dt are integrated out to obtain an estimate of the residual uit:
^ ui = QD^ ºit; (7)
with QD = I ¡D(D0D)¡1D0. An issue in the estimation of the parameters
®i is the orthogonality of the unobserved common factors, ft to the observed
common factors, dt. While not critical for forecasting, a violation of this
assumption clearly would bias the parameter estimates from (1), and this
limitation should be borne in mind when interpreting the results for the
observed common factors.
Using the estimated residuals, uit, we can obtain estimates of ft using
principal components analysis. Forecasting with factors obtained from prin-
ciple components has been discussed in detail by Stock and Watson (2002a)
and Stock and Watson (2002b). Given that we have a estimate of uit in an
unbalanced panel, we estimate the unobserved factors using the EM algo-
rithm outlined by Stock and Watson (2002b). An issue in the estimation of
the factors is the choice of m. For simplicity we ¯x the number of factors to
m = 4. We have also performed the forecasts for smaller m and the results
remain qualitatively unchanged.
2.2 Forecasting








i dt + ¯0
iP 0h
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i£0h



















ift + ei;t+h: (9)
where ai, bi, gi, and ei;t+h have the obvious de¯nitions.
6Hence, a forecast of yi;T+h given the information up to time T, ­T, can
be obtained from
E(yi;T+hj­T) = ^ a0
idT + ^ b
0
ixiT + ^ g0
i^ fT; (10)
where ^ ai, ^ bi and ^ gi are estimates of ai, bi and gi using the estimation
methodology outlined above, and ^ fT is the estimate of fT obtained from ex-
tracting the ¯rst m principal components from the residuals, U = (u1;u2;:::;uN),
estimated in (7).
Alternatively we would be to estimate the models and construct forecasts
based on Ridge or Lasso regressions as described by De Mol, Giannone
and Reichlin (2008) or use methods along the lines of the GVAR modelling
approach proposed by Pesaran, Schuermann and Weiner (2004) and Pesaran,
Schuermann and Smith (forthcoming). However, while the relative e±ciency
of the di®erent methods is an open question, our approach has the advantage
that in addition to correcting for cross-section dependence it also delivers
estimates of the factors and their loadings.
2.3 Forecasting systemic fragility
We now turn to forecasting the system-wide ¯nancial fragility, which is a
main concern of ¯nancial supervisory authorities. A natural measure of





This measure has been used by Tudela and Young (2003) with equal weights,
wi = N¡1. It is important to note that common factors that are not ac-
counted for in the individual forecasts will not be averaged out of the sys-
temic forecast. Hence, for an unbiased estimate of the systemic DD it is
important to account for unobserved common factors, as pointed out by
Chan-Lau and Gravelle (2005) and Cih¶ ak (2006).
However, the average DD may not be the best measure of systemic risk,
since ¯nancial supervisors are mainly concerned about poorly performing
institutions than about the averaged performance of the banking and insur-
ance sector in which negative performance of individual institutions may be
o®set by the positive performance of other institutions. In order to address
the downside risk of the ¯nancial system we also forecast the lower quartile















is an indicator function that is unity if yi;T+hjT is in the
lower quartile. This function can be thought of as the value at risk equivalent
for the ¯nancial supervisor.
72.4 Evaluating the forecasts








i;Tj;h; j = 1;2;:::;M (13)
where ei;Tj;h = (yj;Tj+h¡^ yj;Tj+hjTj)=h, ^ yj;Tj+hjTi is the forecast based on the
information up to Tj.
In order to assess whether forecasts from two models are signi¯cantly





where A and B denote two forecast methods. The Diebold-Mariano statistic
has a standard normal limiting distribution. For the individual forecasts we








where si(h) is the Diebold-Mariano statistic for cross-section unit i, which
has a standard normal limiting distribution.
In our application the forecast sample is relatively short|between 9
and 12|which puts the approximation of the distribution of the si(h) by
the standard normal into question. We therefore bootstrap the distribution
of ¹ s(h) to ensure that our results are not distorted by the short forecast
sample. We are not aware of of any discussion or application of such a
bootstrap procedure in the literature and discuss the details of the bootstrap
in Appendix B.
Finally, we calculate the Kuipers score
KS = H ¡ F
where H is the proportion of DD observations in the lower quartile of the
distribution that are correctly forecast to be in the lower quartile, and F
are the proportion of DD observations that are forecast to be in the lower
quartile but are not, see Granger and Pesaran (2000). Assuming ¯nancial
authorities put particular supervisory e®ort on ¯rms that are in the lower
quartile of the DD distribution, the Kuipers score measures whether the
authorities monitor the right ¯rms.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
The measure of bank and insurance performance is distance-to-default (DD),
which is the di®erence of the ¯rm's value and the ¯rm's liabilities, standard-
8Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Distance-to-Default
Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Banks 13518 5.164 3.307 -0.115 66.375
Insurances 7256 5.131 2.664 -2.145 50.805
ized by the volatility of the ¯rm's value. The ¯rm's value is derived from the
Merton (1974) option value approach and details are given in Appendix A.
The underlying data to calculate the quarterly DD measure are provided
by Datastream. We collected the data for all banks and (life- and non-life)
insurance companies located in the EU-15 (except Luxembourg), Norway,
Switzerland, USA, Canada, Australia, Japan, and Korea for which data were
available, see Table 6. A di±culty is to correctly classify a ¯nancial ¯rm as
a bank or an insurer that exploits a portfolio of activities in both areas,
banking and insurance. We follow the Datastream classi¯cation scheme
in which all companies are coded to both a US styled SIC primary and
secondary industry code designation as well as to their corresponding Dow
Jones Global Industry Grouping. The sample covers the period from 1990Q3
to 2007Q4.
In the estimation we will estimate up to 16 parameters. We therefore
deleted all banks and insurances for which we had in total less than 30
observations and those where we had serious concerns about the data quality,
either due to very small market shares or because of a subsidiary status.
This leaves us with data for 211 banks and 120 insurance companies. A
more detailed sample composition is listed in Table 6 in Appendix C.
Table 1 shows summary statistics of the DD variable. The average per-
formances of banking and insurance companies are comparable. Figure 1
plots the average DD value for the banking and insurance sector over time.
The high correlation of the two series is immediately obvious. Moreover, the
DD values for the banking and insurance sector show a cyclical pattern and
peak in 1996 and a subsequent decline in the following years. From end of
2002 onwards, both sectors seem to recover on average and have reached a
new peak end of 2004. With the start of the ¯nancial turmoil in 2007, the
performance measure of banks and insurances declined again sharply.
Figure 2 gives an example of the time series of the DD of two banks
that were in ¯nancial distress in the past, and where the government or the
central bank had to intervene. Banco Espa~ nol de Cr¶ edito received public
¯nancial support in December 1993 and Svenska Handelsbanken was rescued
by obtaining a government guarantee in December 1992. Prior and during
the crisis events, DD dropped sharply, reaching a negative ¯gure a quarter
after the intervention in the case of Banco Espa~ nol de Cr¶ edito and a value
close to zero at the crisis event in the case of Svenska Handelsbanken.
9Figure 1: Average DD by Sector over Time
Explanatory variables The aim is to predict DD from a macroeconomic
perspective. Firm speci¯c variables frequently used in the literature on ¯rm
default are mostly based on balance-sheet variables and market-driven vari-
ables (Zmijewski 1984, Altman 1993, Shumway 2001, Carling, Lind¶ e and
Roszbach 2007). These variables are accounted for in the construction of
DD in a model based approach, and it is therefore not necessary to include
them as regressors in our model. Furthermore, recent research, such as Car-
ling et al. (2007), indicates that macroeconomic variables have signi¯cant
explanatory power for ¯rm default risk and that taking macroeconomic con-
ditions into account allows to pin down the absolute level of default risk,
while ¯rm-speci¯c information can only make reasonable accurate ranking
of ¯rms' according to default risk.
We use the following macroeconomic variables as candidate variables in
the forecasting model:
1. Long rate: Level of 10yr bond yield for each country
2. Industrial production: Growth rate of industrial production for each
country
3. In°ation: Growth rate of consumer price index for each country
4. Domestic credit: Growth rate of domestic credit for each country
5. Equity returns: Growth rate of stock market index for each country
6. REER: Growth rate of real e®ective exchange rate for each country
10Figure 2: DD for Banco Espa~ nol de Cr¶ edito and Svenska Handelsbanken
7. Unemployment rate: Level of unemployment rate for each country
8. ¢ GDP: Growth rate of GDP for each country
9. P/E ratio: Price-Earning ratio in the US stock market
10. VIX: Chicago Board of Exchange Volatility Index
These variables are commonly used in the literature. For the banking
sector, DemirgÄ u» c-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) show that the probability of
a banking crisis increases with the level of interest rates. The explanation
is that high real interest rates are likely to hurt bank balance sheets as high
lending rates result in a larger fraction of non-performing loans. Von Hagen
and Ho (2004) ¯nd the opposite, namely that banking performance increases
with the (lagged) level of real interest rates, indicating that banking crises
tend to follow real interest rates in the previous period. Shiu (2004) focusses
on the determinants of insurance performance and shows that general insur-
ers are more likely to perform well when the interest rate level is high. The
explanation is that insurance companies invest a large proportion of their
investment portfolios in bonds. However, long-term interest rates also re°ect
in°ation expectations. As pointed out by DemirgÄ u» c-Kunt and Detragiache
(1998), von Hagen and Ho (2004), and Shiu (2004) in°ation is negatively
associated with bank and insurance performance, because it might be a
proxy for macroeconomic mismanagement that a®ects the whole economy
including the banking sector.
Domestic credit growth is used in many studies on banking crises as a
measure of successful ¯nancial liberalization. In our sample of industrialized
11countries, we interpret domestic credit as a proxy for the state of business in
the banking sector, and therefore the pro¯tability of banking in the economy,
which would suggest a positive relationship between domestic credit growth
and DD. However, as shown in several previous studies, such as Goldstein
(1998) and von Hagen and Ho (2004)), banking problems are often preceded
by credit booms, implying a negative relationship between domestic credit
growth and DD. Thus, the overall impact of domestic credit growth and
¯nancial institutions' performance depends on which of the two factors is
more dominant.
Industrial production, GDP growth, and the unemployment rate are
included to capture adverse macroeconomic shocks. Theory predicts that
adverse shocks a®ecting the whole economy will increase the non-performing
loans of banks, which decreases bank performance. This is also consistent
with the observation that systemic banking crisis are associated with °uc-
tuations in the business cycle, see Gorton (1988), Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999), DemirgÄ u» c-Kunt and Huizinger (1998) and DemirgÄ u» c-Kunt and De-
tragiache (1998), Bikker and Hu (2002). Insurance performance is less likely
to be a®ected by °uctuations in the business cycle. We therefore expect a
smaller e®ect of these three variables on the DD values of insurance compa-
nies.
The real e®ective exchange rate (REER) is added to account for exchange
rate risks. An unexpected depreciation of the domestic currency might cause
banking problems if domestic banks borrow in foreign currency and lend in
domestic currency, or because bank borrowers might hold foreign loans. In
both cases, a depreciation threatens the pro¯tability of banks either through
a currency mismatch or through an increase in non-performing loans.
Shiu (2004) argues that the fact that the insurance industry holds a large
share of its investment portfolio in equities high returns on equities enhance
their investment performance. Thus, we expect a positive relationship be-
tween the DD value of insurance companies and equity returns.
We include the price/earnings (P/E) ratio of the US stock market and the
VIX into our regression to control for the e®ect of general market sentiments
on the DD value of banks and insurance companies. A higher P/E ratio
means that investors are paying more for each unit of income. It is likely
that the stock prices of banks and insurance companies are a®ected by these
market sentiments. In periods of high P/E ratios, the stock price of banks
and insurance companies increases independent of the ¯rm's performance,
which causes an increase in their DD value. Thus, we expect a positive
relationship between the P/E ratio and our performance measure.
The VIX, which measures the expected level of (implied) volatility in a
range of options on the S&P 500 index over the next 30 days. The VIX is
often used to measure investors' view of market riskiness and has a more
forward looking character than the P/E ratio. When stock markets are
trending upwards, there is generally a low level of volatility in the markets.
Conversely, when markets are falling, the volatility level usually is high, this
12is why the VIX is often also called the `fear index'. The VIX provides impor-
tant information about investor risk sentiment and market volatility. that
can be helpful in evaluating potential market turning points and measuring
market liquidity. We expect a negative impact of the VIX on DD. Finally,
we add the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variables in the
regression.
4 Empirical analysis
In the ¯rst instance, we test for the existence of cross-section correlation
between the performance of banks and insurances after correcting for the
correlation due to the explanatory variables listed in Section 3. In our data
set N is considerably larger than T and we therefore use the CD test of
Pesaran (2004). Unlike the test of Breusch and Pagan (1980), the CD test
has correct size in panels with large N and small T dimensions.
We perform the cross-section correlation test within and between the
sectors and regions in our sample. The regions that we consider are the
following: ¯rst, all countries in our data set, second, North America, third,
the Europe, and, fourth, Asia and Australia. The results in Table 2 show
that all the CD test statistics, reported in the third column, are signi¯cant
at any conventional signi¯cance level. The fourth column gives the esti-
mated average pairwise correlation coe±cient of the residuals, uit, between
the institutions, and it can be seen that these are quite sizeable. This sug-
gest that even after accounting for the macroeconomic variables in our data
set considerable cross-section dependence remains within but also across re-
gions and industries, which suggests that the accuracy of forecasts may be
improved by incorporating cross-section dependence.
4.1 Firm speci¯c forecasts
We now turn to recursive out-of-sample forecasting of DD for the ¯rms in
our data set. The ¯rst one- and four-quarter ahead forecasts use the data
from 1990Q3 up to 2003Q4 for the estimation of the model. Subsequently
the observation of the next quarter are added to the data for the estimation
and another set of forecasts is constructed. This leads to 12 one-quarter
ahead forecasts for each ¯rm or 2673 one-quarter ahead forecasts overall,
and 8 four-quarter ahead forecasts for each ¯rm, which resulted in 2085
four-quarter ahead forecasts
Given the short time series of observations per ¯rm we select the optimal
set of individual speci¯c regressors for each ¯rm and each forecast period
according to BIC. Given that we are interested in the e®ect of unobserved
common factors, we always include the observed common factors as their
omission might be seen as unduly favoring the unobserved common factor
forecasts.
13Table 2: Cross-section dependence test
Region Industry CD ¹ ^ ½ij
all Banks & Insur. 474.91 0.32
Banks 284.99 0.30
Insurances 197.19 0.37
Banks vs Insur. 222.09 0.32
USA/ Banks & Insur. 172.58 0.64
Canada Banks 125.82 0.51
Insurances 288.87 0.56
Banks vs Insur. 139.94 0.54
Europe Banks & Insur. 200.92 0.37
Banks 112.68 0.35
Insurances 89.95 0.40
Banks vs Insur. 98.05 0.36
Japan/ Banks & Insur. 104.09 0.24
Korea/ Banks 86.77 0.23
Australia Insurances 20.86 0.41
Banks & Insur. 26.24 0.27
CD denotes the CD test statistic, ¹ ^ ½ij the average
pair-wise correlation coe±cient, where the correla-
tion coe±cient is calculated for all pairs of institu-
tions in the given region and industry.
The base line model without unobserved common factors is compared
to models that make di®erent assumption about the pervasiveness of the
unobserved common factors. This also allows some insights into the nature
of the common factors: whether they are speci¯c to the particular industry
and the particular region under consideration, or whether factors a®ect an
industry in all countries or a region in both industries, or whether the same
factors in°uence banks and insurances across all OECD countries.
We therefore use four di®erent schemes to estimate the factors:
² Fac-1: Industry and region speci¯c unobserved common factors. The
factors are estimated separately for Asia/Australia, Europe and North
America and within the regions separately for banks and insurances.
² Fac-2: Industry speci¯c factors. The factors are separately estimated
for banks and insurances but pooled across regions.
² Fac-3: Region speci¯c factors. The factors are pooled across banks
and insurances but estimated separately for Asia/Australia, Europe
and North America.
14² Fac-4: Factors are common across regions and industries and are
pooled across all ¯rms in the data set.
In each scheme we estimate the unobserved common factors by extracting
the ¯rst m principal components from the residuals of the institutions in the
particular region and industry considered in the particular scheme. These
factors are then used to form forecasts of the distance-to-default of the
individual ¯rms.
The results assessing the forecasts for individual ¯rms are reported in
Table 3. The ¯rst panel shows the one-quarter ahead forecasts. It can be
seen that forecasts that use factors that are pooled across all ¯rms (Fac-4)
have the smallest RMSFE. Furthermore, all factor-based forecasts have a
lower RMSFE than the forecasts that do not take factors into account. The
best forecast, Fac-4, reduces the RMSFE by 11% below that of the forecast
without unobserved common factors.
The panel Diebold-Mariano statistics suggest that the factor-based fore-
casts are signi¯cant improvements in all cases|an asterisk indicates that
the 95% bootstrap con¯dence interval did not contain zero. Furthermore,
the forecasts that pool information across industries but not regions (Fac-
2) are dominated by the forecasts that pool information across regions and
industries or only across regions.
The lower panel of Table 3 reports the results for the four-quarters ahead
forecasts. Here we also ¯nd that all forecasts based on factors are better
than the forecasts that do not use unobserved factors. This improvement is
signi¯cant for forecasts taking region and industry speci¯c factors (Fac-1)
and industry speci¯c (Fac-2) into account. The forecasts with region and
industry speci¯c factors have the lowest RMSFE and reduce the RMSFE by
about 8% compared to those without unobserved common factors.
Table 3 also reports the Kuipers score for the di®erent forecasts models.
For h = 1 the forecasts based on factors that are estimated for ¯rms within
regions and industries (Fac-1) and factors that are pooled across regions
(Fac-3) have a higher Kuipers score than forecasts that are constructed
without unobserved common factors. However, for h = 4 the picture reverses
and no factor based forecast has a higher Kuipers score.
4.2 System wide forecasts
The results for the forecasts of the system wide ¯nancial stability are re-
ported in Table 4. For h = 1 the forecasts with the lowest RMSFE are the
ones based on factors that pool information across industries and regions,
which reduces the RMSFE by 29% against that of the forecast without un-
observed factors. Again all factor based forecasts are improvements over
those without factors. The di®erences are signi¯cant at the 10% level but
the tests should be interpreted with caution as they are based on 12 aggre-
gate forecasts only. When forecasting the lower quartile of the distribution
15Table 3: RMSFE and panel Diebold-Mariano test for individual forecasts
No fac. Fac-1 Fac-2 Fac-3 Fac-4
One-quarter ahead forecasts
RMSFE 2.131 1.907 1.924 1.926 1.902
panel Diebold-Mariano statistics
No fac. 13.654* 8.198* 14.541* 13.320*




0.362 0.397 0.330 0.402 0.338
Four-quarter ahead forecasts
RMSFE 2.653 2.448 2.561 2.528 2.595
panel Diebold-Mariano statistics
No fac. 2.214* 6.106* 1.01 0.151




0.269 0.168 0.109 0.234 0.156
No fac: No factors beyond the observed regressors; Fac-1: region and
industry speci¯c factors; Fac-2: industry speci¯c factors; Fac-3: region
speci¯c factors; Fac-4: factors across regions and industries. The panel





B;T;h, where A is the forecast errors obtained from the method given
in the column on the left and B are the forecast errors from the method
given in the top row. We used 1000 bootstrap repetitions. An asterisk
indicates that the 95% con¯dence interval did not contain zero.
of distance-to-default all forecasts using unobserved common factors have a
lower RMSFE, the only exception is the forecast using region speci¯c factors
(Fac-3). Using region and industry speci¯c factors leads to an improvement
of 28% of the RMSFE over the forecast without unobserved common factors.
However, again the di®erences are not statistically signi¯cant.
The aggregate forecasts for h = 4 also vastly improve when taking unob-
served factors into account. The RMSFE average forecast of DD is improved
by up to 23% when pooling the information across industries for the prin-
ciple components estimation. However, when forecasting the lower quartile
of the distribution of the distance-to-default for h = 4, we do not ¯nd that
taking unobserved common factors into account leads to an improvement of
16Table 4: RMSFE and Diebold-Mariano test for systemic forecasts
No fac. Fac-1 Fac-2 Fac-3 Fac-4
One-quarter ahead forecasts
Average
RMSFE 0.324 0.236 0.258 0.288 0.231
Diebold-Mariano statistics
No fac. 1.740 1.641 1.401 1.552




RMSFE 0.228 0.164 0.183 0.243 0.217
Diebold-Mariano statistics
No fac. 1.191 0.881 ¡0.821 0.422





RMSFE 0.536 0.491 0.416 0.512 0.490
Diebold-Mariano statistics
OLS 0.644 0.717 0.383 0.436




RMSFE 0.276 0.307 0.286 0.299 0.401
Diebold-Mariano statistics
OLS ¡0.952 ¡0.663 ¡1.218 ¡1.654
Fac-1 1.241 0.347 ¡2.133
Fac-2 ¡0.886 ¡1.829
Fac-3 ¡2.054
See footnote of Table 3. The signi¯cance of the Diebold-Mariano test
statistics is assessed against the standard normal distribution. The
average RMSFEs are scaled up by 100 for ease of exposition.
17the RMSFE. Forecasts ignoring unobserved factors have the lowest RMSFE.
This result coincides with the result that the Kuiper score for h = 4 is the
highest for the forecast model ignoring unobserved factors, as shown in Ta-
ble 3. While, the Diebold Mariano test shows that the di®erences in the
ability of the di®erent forecast models to forecast the average and the lower
quantile distribution of DD are not signi¯cant, these test should be inter-
preted with caution given the small number of aggregate forecasts.
4.3 The determinants of distance-to-default
An interesting bye-product of the forecasts are the parameter estimates and
the optimal choice of variables according to BIC. Here we report the average
parameter estimate of the variables that are included in the model and the
probability of a variable being included in the optimal model based on BIC
for the last forecast, that is based on the sample from 1990Q3 to 2007Q3.
The parameters of the regressors xit, ^ ¯it are obtained from the CCE estima-
tor in (6) using the cross-section averages across all ¯rms. The parameters
for the common regressors, ^ ®it are estimated by OLS using the estimated
unobserved common factors and therefore rely on the orthogonality of the
unobserved common factors.
The estimation results are given in Table 5. The second and third
columns show the average of the estimated coe±cients across banks con-
ditional on being in the optimal set of regressors base on BIC and the prob-
ability of inclusion in the model. The fourth and ¯fth column show the same
results for insurances.
The ¯gures in column 1 and 2 indicate that the average of the individual
determinants of banking performance show the expected sign in most cases.
The variable that is included most often is the lagged dependent variable.
From the macroeconomic variables the long term interest rate and the un-
employment date are included most often However, all variables are included
in a substantial subset of the models.
The long term interest rate is positively related to DD, which con¯rms
the ¯ndings in the empirical literature. In°ation in°uences the performance
measure negatively for both banks and insurances. The positive sign of
domestic credit suggests that this variable acts as a measure of the health
of banking business. Out of the cyclical variables unemployment and GDP
for insurances have the expected sign, while industrial production and GDP
for banks have the opposite sign to theoretical predictions. Out of these
variables, however, unemployment seems to be the most important.
The parameters for the common observed factors show that the P/E ratio
for banks and the VIX enter with the correct sign compared to our a priori
expectations. However, these two parameters should be interpreted with
caution, given that they rely on orthogonality to the unobserved factors.
The parameter for insurances are very similar. The only exception is the
18Table 5: Determinants of distance-to-default
¹ µ p ¹ µ p
Banks Insurances
lagged dep.var. 0.450 0.820 0.385 0.600
long rate 2.177 0.171 0.439 0.233
ind.prod. ¡0.025 0.123 ¡0.374 0.192
in°ation ¡0.138 0.166 ¡0.300 0.200
equity ret. ¡0.017 0.137 0.017 0.167
REER 0.020 0.166 0.117 0.200
unemploy. ¡0.201 0.194 ¡0.230 0.258
GDP ¡0.130 0.123 0.184 0.192
intercept 2.889 { 5.431 {
P/E ratio 0.017 { ¡0.022 {
VIX ¡0.050 { ¡0.057 {
The estimates are from the last one-step ahead forecast with
data up to 2007Q3. ¹ µ are the average coe±cients conditional
on the variable being included in the best model according
to BIC. p denotes the proportion of forecasts that included
the respective variable.
negative sign of REER.
Finally, the increasing use of credit derivatives and other ¯nancial prod-
ucts that are traded on a global scale would suggest that the correlation
between the institutions may have increase. In order to shed light on this
we plot the parameter estimates of the ¯rst four principal components over
the forecast period in Figure 3. It can be seen that the factor loadings have
increased very mildly at best over our relatively short forecast period, which
does not seem to lend itself to the interpretation of a drastically increased
correlation between institutions. However, we leave it to future research to
investigate this issue in greater detail.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we argue that not only the ¯nancial linkages between banks
but also the linkages between banks and insurance companies are important
when analyzing and forecasting their fragility. Our empirical analysis is
based on the performance measure distance-to-default (DD). We investigate
the importance of a number of macroeconomic variables and unobserved fac-
tors on the performance of banks and insurances. We ¯nd that unobserved
common factors play an important role. In particular, taking the unobserved
factors into account leads up to 11% reduction in the RMSFE of the fore-
19Figure 3: Time series of ¹ ^ ° over the forecast period

















`gamma1' denotes the estimated parameters for the ¯rst principal com-
ponent, `gamma2' that of the second, `gamma3' that of the third, and
`gamma4' that of the fourth principal component. The dates on the x-
axis gives the last observation in the estimation sample for the respective
parameter estimates; all samples start in 19990Q3.
casts of individual ¯rms DD. Furthermore, the forecasts are more accurate
in tracking the position of a ¯rm within the distribution of DD. Systemic
risk can also be forecast better as the aggregate RMSFE is reduced by 29%
in one-quarters ahead forecasts and by 23% in four-quarters ahead forecasts.
Furthermore, estimates of the factor loadings suggest that the correlation
between banks has not increased throughout the forecast period.
20A A structural model of credit risk: Distance-to-default
The indicator `distance-to-default' has been introduced by Crosbie and Bohn
(2003) and is based on the derivative pricing model proposed by Merton
(1974), which is the prototype of many ¯rm-value models.
In Merton's model a ¯rm ¯nances itself by equity and debt. Debt is of
zero-coupon form with face value B and maturity T. Let St and Bt denote
the equity and debt value at time t, then a ¯rm's asset value is simply the
sum of these two, i.e. Vt = St + Bt, 0 · t · T. Default occurs if the ¯rm
cannot meet its payments to the debt holders, that means if VT · B.
Following Black and Scholes (1973), the value of a ¯rm's assets Vt follows
a geometric Brownian motion with a constant drift equal to the risk free
interest rate ¹V and a constant di®usion rate equal to ¾V ,
dVt = ¹V Vtdt + ¾V VtdWt; (15)
where Wt is a standard Brownian motion. It follows that the value of the
¯rm's asset at any time T is given by











where ²T = WT¡Wt p
(T¡t) » N(0;1). The default probability of the ¯rm is then
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where r denotes the deterministic and risk-free interest rate. Thus, distance-
to-default measures the number of standard deviations that the ¯rm's asset
value is away from the default point B.
In order to be able to calculate a ¯rm's distance-to-default on basis of
equation (18), we ¯rst have to determine the two unknown parameters Vt
and ¾V . To do so, we make use of the fundamental idea of the Merton
model, which says that the shareholders payo® at time T can be considered
as a European call option on the ¯rm's assets VT with the strike price equal
to the face value of the debt outstanding B,
ST = max(VT ¡ B;0) = (VT ¡ B)+: (19)
If the value of the ¯rm's assets exceeds the liabilities, VT > B, debt holders
will receive the full face value of debt B and equity holders receive the
21balance St = VT ¡ B. If the value of the ¯rm's assets is less than its
liabilities, the ¯rm cannot meet its ¯nancial obligations. In this case debt
holders receive the actual ¯rm value VT and shareholders receive nothing,
ST = 0.
Applying the Black-Scholes call-option formula, we can derive the fol-
lowing relationship between the current equity value St and the ¯rm's asset
value Vt:
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Further, from Ito's lemma the following relationship between equity and





Equations (20) and (21) describe now a set of two non-linear equations
with two unknowns, i.e. Vt and ¾V , that can be solved numerically by using a
generalised gradient method.2 Based on these estimates, distance-to-default
in equation (18) can be calculated.
B Bootstrap procedure for the panel Diebold-Mariano
test
In order to test whether a di®erence in forecasts is signi¯cant we calculate a
panel Diebold-Mariano test statistic as explained in Section 2.4. As the small
sample properties are unknown we calculate con¯dence intervals using a
block bootstrap procedure, where each block is the Diebold-Mariano statistic
for a cross-section unit, i. The reason to use a block bootstrap is that the
time series of forecasts from each cross-section unit are relatively short and,
in particular for larger h, likely to be autocorrelated.
The bootstrap con¯dence intervals are calculated as follows. We ¯rst








where si(h) is the Diebold-Mariano statistic for cross-section unit i. Next








i(h); b = 1;2;:::;B;
2We thank Reint Gropp and Jukka Vesala for providing their visual basic codes to
calculate the distance-to-default measures.
22where the sb
i(h) are sampled from the set of fsi(h)gN
i=1 with replacement.








where zB;® is the value of the ® quantile in the sample of zb = [¹ sb(h) ¡
E(¹ sb(h))]=
p
VAR(¹ sb(h)), and the variance of ¹ s(h), v2
s, is calculated via the
jackknife.
C Data sources
The data used for the calculation of the D2D have the following sources:
² Total Liabilities = (Total Assets) - (Total Share Capital and Reserves)
Total Assets: Datastream, annual frequency interpolated to quarterly
data
Total Share Capital and Reserves: Datastream, annual frequency in-
terpolated to quarterly data
² Market Value: Datastream, quarterly frequency
² Interest rates: short-term interest rates (3-months): Datastream, quar-
terly frequency
² Equity prices: Datastream, daily frequency to calculate 6-month mov-
ing averages.
The macroeconomic data have the following sources:
² Long-term interest rate: OECD Economic Outlook.
² Industrial production: IMF International Financial Statistics, line 66,
transformed into growth rates: ¢indpt = 100ln(indpt=indpt¡4)
² In°ation: IMF International Financial Statistics, line 64, transformed
into growth rates: in°t = 100ln(CPI t=CPI t¡4)
² Domestic credit: IMF International Financial Statistics, line 32, trans-
formed into growth rates: ¢domcrt = 100ln(domcrt=domcrt¡4)
² Equity returns: IMF International Financial Statistics, line 62, trans-
formed into growth rates: ¢eqrett = 100ln(eqrett=eqrett¡4)
² Real e®ective exchange rate: IMF International Financial Statistics,
line REU, transformed into growth rates: ¢reert = 100ln(reert=reert¡4)
² Unemployment ratios: OECD Economic Outlook.
23² Growth rates of GDP: IMF International Financial Statistics, line 62,
transformed into growth rates: ¢GDPt = ln(GDPt=GDPt¡4)=100
² CBOE Volatility Index VIX: Chicago Board Options Exchange web-
side (www.cboe.com).
² The price-earnings ratio is based on the S&P500 composite provided
by Datastream.
We have tested the variables for stationarity using the panel unit root
test of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003). In order to conserve space, the results
are not reported here but can be obtained from the authors. They do,
however, suggest that the assumption of stationarity is a reasonable one.
Table 6: Sample composition
Banks Life Non-Life Total
Insurances Insurances Insurances
Australia 8 1 1 2
Austria 2 - 2 2
Belgium 4 - - 0
Canada 8 3 2 5
Denmark 7 - 2 2
Finland 1 - 1 1
France 6 1 3 4
Germany 4 1 9 10
Greece - - - 0
Ireland 3 1 1 2
Italy 17 3 8 11
Japan 61 - 6 6
Korea 3 - 3 3
Netherlands 2 2 - 2
Norway 1 1 - 1
Portugal 5 - - 0
Spain 13 - 2 2
Sweden 4 - - 0
UK 6 6 7 13
USA 40 8 40 48
Switzerland 16 2 4 6
Total 211 29 91 120
24References
Allen, Franklin, and Elena Carletti (2006) `Credit risk transfer and conta-
gion.' Journal of Monetary Economics 53(1), 89{111.
Altman, Edward I. (1993) Corporate Financial Distress and Bankruptcy: A
Complete Guide to Predicting and Avoiding Distress and Pro¯tting from
Bankruptcy (New York: John Wiley and Sons).
Arora, N., J. Bohn, and F. Zhu (2005) `Reduced form versus structural
models of credit risk: A case study of three models.' Moody's KMV White
Paper.
Berg, Andrew, and Catherine Pattillo (1999) `Predicting currency crises:
The indicator approach and an alternative.' Journal of International
Money and Finance 18(4), 561{586.
Bernanke, Ben S., Jean Boivin, and Piotr Eliasz (2005) `Measuring the e®ect
of monetary policy: A factor-augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR)
approach.' Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, 387{422.
Bharath, Sreedhar T., and Tyler Shumway (2008) `Forecasting default
with the Merton distance to default model.' Review of Financial Stud-
ies 21(3), 1339{1369.
Bikker, J. A., and H. Hu (2002) `Cyclical patterns in pro¯ts, provisioning and
lending of banks and procyclicality of the new Basel capital requirements.'
BNL Quarterly Review 221, 143{175.
Black, Fischer, and Myron Scholes (1973) `The valuation of options and
corporate liabilities.' Journal of Political Economy 81, 637{654.
Breusch, T. S., and Adrian R. Pagan (1980) `The Lagrange multiplier test
and its application to model speci¯cation in Econometrics.' Review of
Economic Studies 47, 239{253.
Carling, Kenneth, Tor J. J. Lind¶ e, and Kasper Roszbach (2007) `Corporate
credit risk modelling and the macroeconomy.' Journal of Banking and
Finance 31(3), 845{868.
Chan-Lau, Jorge A., and Toni Gravelle (2005) `The END: A new indicator
of ¯nancial and non¯nancial corporate sector vulnerability.' IMF Working
paper 05/231.
Chan-Lau, Jorge A., Arnaud Jobert, and Janet Kong (2004) `An option-
based approach to bank vulnerabilities in emerging markets.' IMF Work-
ing paper 04/33.
Cih¶ ak, Martin (2006) `How do central banks write on ¯nancial stability?'
IMF Working paper 06/133.
Crosbie, Peter, and Je® Bohn (2003) `Modeling default risk.' mimeo,
Moody's KMV.
De Bandt, Olivier, and Philipp Hartmann (2002) `Systemic risk: A survey.'
In Financial Crises, Contagion and the Lender of the Last Resort, ed.
C. Goodhart and G. Illing (Oxford: Oxford University Press) pp. 249{97.
De Mol, Christine, Domenico Giannone, and Lucrezia Reichlin (2008)
25`Forecasting using a large number of predictors: Is Bayesian shrinkage
a valid alternative to principal components.' Journal of Econometrics
146(2), 318{328.
DemirgÄ u» c-Kunt, Asli, and Enrica Detragiache (1998) `The determinants of
banking crises in developing and developed countries.' IMF Sta® Papers.
DemirgÄ u» c-Kunt, Asli, and H. Huizinger (1998) `Determinants of commercial
bank interest margins and pro¯tability: Some international evidence.'
World Bank Economic Review 13, 379{408.
Demirovic, Amer, and Dylan C. Thomas (2007) `The relevance of accounting
data in the measurement of credit risk.' European Journal of Finance
13(3), 253{268.
Diebold, Francis X., and Roberto S. Mariano (1995) `Comparing predictive
accuracy.' Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 12, 253{263.
Edison, Hali J. (2003) `Do indicators of ¯nancial crises work? an evalua-
tion of an early warning system.' International Journal of Finance and
Economics 8(1), 11{53.
Frankel, Je®rey A., and Andrew K. Rose (1996) `Currency crashes in emerg-
ing markets: An empirical treatment.' Journal of International Eco-
nomics 41(3/4), 351{366.
Goldstein, Morris (1998) `The Asian ¯nancial crisis: Causes, cures, and
systematic implication.' Peterson Institute for International Economics
Policy Analyses in International Economics 55.
Gorton, G. (1988) `Banking panics and business cycles.' Oxford Economic
Papers 40(4), 751{781.
Granger, Clive W. J., and M. Hashem Pesaran (2000) `Economic and statis-
tical measures of forecast accuracy.' Journal of Forecasting 19(7), 537{560.
Gropp, Reint J., and Gerard Moerman (2004) `Measurement of conta-
gion in bank equity prices.' Journal of International Money and Finance
23(3), 405{459.
Gropp, Reint J., Jukka Vesala, and Giuseppe Vulpes (2006) `Equity and
bond market signals as leading indicators of bank fagility.' Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking 38(2), 399{428.
Hagen, JÄ urgen von, and Tai-Kuang Ho (2004) `Money market pressure and
the determinants of banking crises.' Journal of Money, Credit, and Bank-
ing 39(5), 1037{1066.
Hillegeist, Stephen A., Elisabeth K. Keating, Donald P. Cram, and Kyle G.
Lundstedt (2004) `Assessing the probability of bankrupcy.' Review of Ac-
counting Studies 9, 5{24.
Im, Kyung So, M. Hashem Pesaran, and Yongcheol Shin (2003) `Testing for
unit roots in heterogeneous panels.' Journal of Econometrics 115(1), 53{
74.
Kaminsky, Graciela L., and Carmen M. Reinhart (1999) `The twin crises;
the causes of banking and balance-of-payments problems.' American Eco-
nomic Review 89(3), 473{500.
26Kaminsky, Graciela L., Saul Lizondo, and Carmen M. Reinhart (1998)
`Leading indicators of currency crises.' IMF Sta® Papers 45(1), 1{48.
Kumar, Mohan, Uma Moorthy, and William Perraudin (2002) `Predict-
ing emerging market currency crashes.' Journal of Empirical Finance
10(4), 427{454.
Merton, Robert C. (1974) `On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk struc-
ture of interest rates.' Journal of Finance 29, 449{470.
Monks, Allan, and Marco Stringa (2005) `Inter-industry linkages between
UK life insurers and UK banks: An event study.' Bank of England Fi-
nancial Stability Review 18, 127{134.
Pesaran, M. Hashem (2004) `General diagnostic tests for cross section de-
pendence in panels.' Cambridge Working Paper in Economics 0435.
(2006) `Estimation and inference in large heterogeneous panels with a
multifactor error structure.' Econometrica 74(4), 967{1012.
Pesaran, M. Hashem, and Andreas Pick (2007) `Econometric issues in
the analysis of contagion.' Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
31(4), 1245{1277.
Pesaran, M. Hashem, Til Schuermann, and L. Vanessa Smith (forthcoming)
`Forecasting economic and ¯nancial variables with global VARs.' Inter-
national Journal of Forecasting.
Pesaran, M. Hashem, Til Schuermann, and Scott M. Weiner (2004) `Model-
ing regional interdependencies using a global error-correcting macroecono-
metric model.' Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 22(2), 129{
162.
Shiu, Y. (2004) `Determinants of United Kingdom general insurance com-
pany performance.' British Actuarial Journal 10(5), 1079{1110.
Shumway, Tyler (2001) `Forecasting bankruptcy more accurately: A simple
hazard model.' Journal of Business 74(1), 101{124.
Slijkerman, Jan F., Dirk Schoenmaker, and Caspar G. de Vries (2005) `Risk
diversi¯cation by European ¯nancial conglomerates.' Tinbergen Institute
Discussion Paper 110/2.
Stock, James H., and Mark W. Watson (2002a) `Forecasting using principle
components from a large number of predictors.' Journal of the American
Statistical Association 97(460), 1167{1179.
(2002b) `Macroeconomic forecasting using di®usion indexes.' Journal of
Business and Economic Statistics 20(2), 147{162.
Tudela, Merxe, and Garry Young (2003) `Predicting default among UK com-
panies: A Merton approach.' Bank of England Financial Stability Review.
Vassalou, Maria, and Yuhang Xing (2004) `Default risk in equity returns.'
Journal of Finance 59(2), 831{868.
Zmijewski, M. E. (1984) `Methodological issues related to the estimation
of ¯nancial distress prediction models.' Journal of Accounting Research
22, 59{82.
27